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SUMMARY 
Several recent studies propose that political choices of Indian youth can hardly be distinguished from 
those of their parents in many respects. Contrary to this well-established understanding, this article 
shows that when set apart from the spheres of family and work, students in a flagship Indian university 
– mostly in the social sciences and humanities – gradually transform their political attitudes in light of 
prolonged exposure to a campus environment. Through combining ethnographic study with the 
analysis of a survey of political attitudes of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) students, we show that 
time spent in situ fosters participation to political activities, increases chances of joining a student 
organization and make students more likely to identify themselves as politically radical. The class and 
caste background of students, on the other hand, are not strongly associated with political attitudes, 
showing the integrative nature of politicization on the JNU campus.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent survey studies1 show that in many respects, political choices of Indian youth can hardly be 
distinguished from those of their parents. Contrary to this well-established understanding, this article 
shows that when set apart from the spheres of family and work, students in a flagship Indian university – 
mostly in the social sciences and humanities – gradually transform their political attitudes in light of 
prolonged exposure to a campus environment. The article provides a case study of the everyday politics 
of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), a prestigious postgraduate and residential ‘central university’2 in 
New Delhi. We build our argument by combining ethnographic evidence drawing from 16 months of 
fieldwork with quantitative analysis of novel survey data. 
The study argues that observed transformations are driven by an intergenerational process of 
peer-to-peer socialization, in which politicized ‘seniors’ greatly influence the attitude of new cohorts. A 
setting such as JNU facilitates the formation of intergenerational political kinships often at odds with 
one’s previous worldview. Sustained activist competition and rivalry, channeled by well-organized 
student organizations, create multiple incentives for progressive partisan identification. While caste, class 
and community identities partly mediate political subjectivities and the meaning-making of students, 
these markers alone do not drive the political participation. In the present case, student politicization 
inclines towards inclusiveness, even though women and upper-class students tend to be less affected by 
it.  
The diachronic process which enables the acquisition of new political values cannot be separated 
from the development of increasingly complex networks of loyalties and friendships involving student 
activists. These figures appear to be crucial authorities on campus, as they also turn out to be seniors, 
bhaiya/didi (brother/sister, also friend), councilors, patrons and fixers. The political impact of these 
leaders is further legitimated by activist-professors, who often have an analogous background in student 
activism, and share both mentorship of affiliated participants and the ideological narratives of common 
students.  
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This ethnographic study proposes a portrayal of the ordinary course of micro-politics on campus 
without reducing it to an electoral game. We make the epistemic choice of inferring from daily instances 
of political participation rather than on exceptional occurrences of political unrest. In order to present a 
parsimonious picture of the encompassing effects of prolonged campus presence, the article does not 
provide an exhaustive account of the ideological cleavages between the various political student groups 
found at JNU. The aim is to reveal that the politicization experienced by various student communities on 
campus is pervasive and goes beyond ideological divides.  
The picture presented by the ethnographic study is then tested on survey data that the first 
author has collected in the first semester of the 2014-15 academic year. Through the empirical analysis, 
we find that time spent as a JNU student is positively associated with self-reported political radicalization, 
the likelihood of membership to a political organization, and participation in political events. These 
findings are robust to various model specifications. Even when we control for age, the number of 
semesters spent studying at JNU is a significant predictor of politicization. Overall, the empirical analysis 
is highly consistent with the ethnographic study. Based both on our work in the field and the empirical 
analysis of the survey data, we propose that exposure to the JNU environment profoundly influences 
students in terms of political attitudes and behavior. 
The rest of the contribution is structured around two main sections. The article first provides a 
brief overview of the literature on student and youth politics in the world and in India while discussing 
the historical endurance of the political culture at JNU. It then presents the ethnographic study carried 
out by the first author. The section outlines the central role of peers and professors in the passing down 
of political values and practices. Next, the paper substantiates the argument by quantifying the 
politicization at hand. Informed by the ethnographic analysis, we formulate four testable hypotheses. We 
continue with the empirical analysis of the original survey data, which shows strong support for our 
arguments. 
 
3 
 
EXPLAINING YOUTH POLITICAL ATTITUDES: THE UNRESOLVED ‘PRIMARY VS SECONDARY 
SOCIALIZATION’ DEBATE  
One of the most reliable findings in survey studies conducted in Western countries is that political 
partisanship is mostly influenced by childhood socialization, and often gains strength over the course of 
a lifetime.3 As Inglehart notes, “a large body of evidence indicates that people’s basic values are largely 
fixed when they reach adulthood, and change relatively little thereafter.”4 Most quantitative accounts 
looking at lifetime trajectories stress the importance of the worldview of parents in the development of 
political attitudes,5 which subsequently display stability across the phases of adulthood.6 These studies 
concentrating on pre-adult value transmission in the family show that parents have more influence than 
professors and peers regarding political attitudes.7 
Recent political science scholarship shows the limits of the persistence model of political 
socialization, which emphasizes the crystallization of political personalities before adulthood. 
Alternatives propose that certain young adults are particularly open to changing their early acquired 
political perceptions in consistence with both the life-cycle model and the impressionable years model.8 
The latter approach claims that individuals are attracted to certain attitudes at specific life junctures, such 
as conservatism at the age of retirement and radical ideas at a young age.9 The former shows that the 
zeitgeist and the Lagerung10 could influence a whole generation,11 thus forging collective memories of 
often traumatic events, such as French youth during the Algerian war and the protests of May 196812 or 
young Americans during the Vietnam War.13 The current youth in Western democracies commonly 
display mistrust for institutions and representatives, leading to decreased voting turnout and partisan 
allegiance, a lack of belief in political narratives, and greater involvement in participatory forms of 
democracy.14 
The work of Percheron identifies three possible roles of education in shaping the political 
attitudes of students.15  The content of educational classes determines to a certain extent the student’s 
understanding of institutions and norms of one’s society. School is also a place where certain democratic 
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mechanisms are learned through the election of class representatives and school councils.16 Almond and 
Verba showed the efficiency of school participation in the preparation for political life.17 Finally, school is 
the place where individuals learn to develop certain forms of horizontal social relations with peers.18 The 
scholarship challenging the persistence model usually supports the notion that university impacts socio-
political attitudes, because students socialize with each other.19 University provides free spaces to 
cultivate alternative ideologies20 and to interact with mates from diverse cultural and social 
backgrounds.21 
Our study proposes that local contexts such as campus spaces influence political preferences,22 
thus we are keen to emphasize the transformative impact of interpersonal relations.23 This approach is 
at odds with most behavioral studies in the United States that consider political attitudes to be a product 
of “personal” calculus, irrespective of the individual’s immediate social environment.24  
Challenging this approach, the recent literature focusing on biographical consequences of social 
movements has been less hesitant to acknowledge the importance of place on the selective socialization 
of youth cohorts. According to this line of research, commitment to political activities may not only 
involve political learning,25 but also the opening up of new life chances26 and the acquisition of new 
identifications,27 in turn fostering the institutionalization of grassroots protests.28 Personal 
transformations are accompanied by shifts in political imagination29 and religious orientation.30 They 
trigger feelings of ‘satiety’ over victorious issues31 and are accompanied by a phase of cognitive liberation 
often prefiguring political mobilization.32  
Sustained political participation does have long-lasting effects on the lives of its protagonists. As 
summarized by Giugni,33 follow-up studies of American New Left student activism show that social 
movement activities have profoundly affected their biographies, which appear to differ significantly from 
those of non-activist generations. Even years after the events, former activists displayed more radical 
ideologies and greater participation in conventional politics and protests. These studies acknowledge the 
long-lasting effects of collective exposure to political environments. Within these settings, cohorts of 
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participants build distinct collective identities.34 Campus socialization is thus fueled by a dual process of 
assimilation and expectation building.35  
For the purpose of our study, political socialization can be defined as a continuous, multi-situated 
and processual interaction36 in which Indian youth develop new understandings of society, gender, labor, 
caste, history and self-identity. Social movement scholars argue that the comprehension of politics 
changes overtime and that youth university students are more likely to experience such ideological 
refashioning. Youth is seen both as a distinct phase of development and a period for expressing cultural 
agency,37 where individuals incorporate a secondary form of habitus, internalizing new orientations to 
action.38 When marrying, starting employment or registering as a university student, a youngster is likely 
to resettle and socially adjust to unknown environments. In the case of university education, the 
individual is a stranger in a new academic environment and “is about to transform himself [sic] from an 
unconcerned onlooker into a would-be member of the approached group.”39 Because of the rapidly 
changing roles experienced during early adulthood, we can confidently say that discontinuities in political 
behavior and attitudes are more likely to occur in this time period than later in life.40 
INTRODUCING THE POLITICS OF INDIAN EDUCATED YOUTH  
In the aftermath of the 1968 student movements around the world, explanations of student mobilization 
in the Indian context stressed mostly socio-psychological factors. Some authors focused on generational 
conflict between parents and dependents41 while others emphasized the weakening of traditional 
authority structures42 and the alienation of youth from the decision-making processes of political 
institutions.43 These reductionist approaches, while looking at youth as a transformative phase of life, did 
not explicitly question the empirical processes at work in gradual campus politicization.  
As Shah summarizes, the literature on student movements in India is scant after the 1980s and 
full of “stray observations, wishful thinking and personal anecdotes.”44 Most of the work focusing on so-
called “student indiscipline” portrays student behavior as an unchanging given. Such accounts depict 
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political participation by youth either as a component of party politics45 or as a pathological aspiration for 
agitation.46 
Recent scholarship emphasizes the lack of ideological character of South Asian student politics 
after the anti-colonial47 nationalist movement (1905-1947).48 It often depicts joining a student branch of 
a political party as a way to secure one’s personal interests, such as a seat in a student hall,49 or to 
accumulate private networks for business opportunities at the local level.50 Student politics is understood 
within the framework of patronage where leaders,51 aligned with political parties, indulge in goondaism 
(criminal behavior),52 violent disturbances53 and caste-based brokerage, often involving lucrative 
mediation between university administrations and private contractors.54 Political participation is viewed 
as an instrument for future leadership in national or regional politics.55 Often derided by students as 
opportunists or sycophants (chamchas),56 student leaders (netas) are associated with ‘dirty’ politicians 
and blamed for their careerism,57 their dishonesty58 and their corruption.59  
Political actors themselves tend however to depict Indian youth as potential force of agitation 
against the establishment.60 Various manifestos and press releases of Indian Communist and Maoist 
parties emphasize the rebellious nature of students.61 According to these views, student political activists 
carry an inherent but mostly latent ability to reject mainstream careerist party politics. As a former 
general secretary of the JNU students’ union declared, students can “acquire a heightened or radical 
consciousness through ideological engagement and praxis in order to transform aspects of society 
through the political process.”62 Post-independence student radicalism is associated with the anti-
corruption movement led by former freedom fighter Jay Prakash Narayan (termed the JP movement) in 
Bihar in 197463 and to the resistance against the decision of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to impose 
internal Emergency.64 Peasant-oriented Maoist rebellion in the late 1960s in West Bengal attracted 
academically accomplished65 and highly educated urban youth.66 Students also substantially supported 
the 1965 anti-Hindi protests67 in Madras state (today’s Tamil Nadu) and participated in the movement for 
the creation of the state of Telangana, including the 1952 Mulkhi (local) agitation and more recent 
mobilization leading to the formation of the state in June 2014.68 
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Nevertheless, when looking at the pan-Indian picture, patterns of youth politicization remain 
unclear. The third round of the Youth Survey69 indicates that when it comes to politics, youth tend to be 
undistinguishable from senior generations. The offspring of parents who take interest in politics are more 
likely to be interested in politics than youth whose parents do not have any interest.70  
The lack of distinctiveness of youth politicization in India is confirmed by the work of Kumar.71 By 
analyzing five parliamentary elections covering the period 1996-2014, he proposes that there is no voting 
pattern for youth when compared to subsequent generations. He also shows that politicized youth are 
not led by their educated sections. Both 2006 and 2016 survey rounds show the endurance of 
absenteeism in which the voting turnout of illiterate youth exceeds that of graduates. College-educated 
young women in India participate less than non-literate young women and the upper class records the 
lowest level of electoral participation overall.72  
Overall, educational experiences of Indian youth do not seem to significantly increase their 
‘political consciousness’ in the long run. This sits at odds with the literature on youth politics in the Global 
South which portrays youth as a politicized life-stage.73 More specifically, studies on student movements 
in various countries acknowledge the leading role taken by elite universities,74 and in particular those in 
the social sciences.75  
Through looking at the way JNU students get socialized into politics, we demonstrate that this 
university is coherent with the global picture but might stand as an exception in the Indian political 
landscape. Accordingly, the first stage of the following analysis engages with the history of youth activism 
at JNU and scrutinizes how rivalrous political cultures of the left have taken root on campus for more 
than four decades.  
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THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
On its inauguration day, 14 November 1969, the Indian National Congress leader and Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi wished that Jawaharlal Nehru University would become an institution “conducive to social 
change.”76 Batabyal shows how, in the wake of India’s socialist and secular zeitgeist, many appointed 
professors in disciplines such as History, Economics and International Relations abided by the leftist 
credos defended by the party in power and its political ally of the time, the Communist Party of India 
(CPI).77  
However, it did not take long for JNU to become an anti-establishment and anti-Emergency78 
center,79 led mainly by student representatives leaning towards alternative left ideologies. It was led by 
the newly formed Students’ Federation of India (SFI), an affiliate of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
(CPI(M)) – i.e. a splinter group of CPI which governed the state of West Bengal from 1977 to 2011.80 SFI 
leadership was challenged by the autonomous student group Free Thinkers,81 inspired by Indian socialists 
Ram Manohar Lohia and the aforementioned Jai Prakash Narayan. A third stream of leftism represented 
marginalised groups embracing more radical ideologies such as Trotskyism82 and Maoist-inspired83 
Naxalism. 
After the Emergency, JNU student politics became an enduring bastion of competing left 
ideologies along with other campuses such as Jadavpur University, Presidency College (West Bengal), 
Osmania (Telangana) and several Colleges in Kerala.84 Commentators, whether enthusiasts or skeptics, 
usually consider JNU from its inception as a leftist landmark in Indian politics. It has been recognized as 
an enduring Marxist bastion,85 a space of academic and political dissent through debate and discussion,86 
a place where professors preach new-left ideologies87 and an environment in which activism is an integral 
part of student life.88 
Data collected by the first author indicates that most of the JNU student representatives are 
affiliated to political organizations; only less than 20 percent of the elected presidents of the JNU Student 
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Union were supported by independent platforms (see Table 1). This is consistent with the fairly long 
legacy of political alignment and mentoring on campuses across the country.89 Such tradition took roots 
in the 1930s when the National independence leaders such as Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru 
started using student forums both as a recruitment agency and as a platform to pressurize the Congress 
towards more separatism and militant positions.90 This approach was soon emulated by the then united 
Indian communist party which took control of the main organized body of students at the All-India 
Students’ Conference in Nagpur in 1940.91 After independence, various new political outfits created their 
own student wings in order to gain control of university campuses. Table 1 shows the organizational 
strength of various communist parties in the JNU campus; it also reflects the ideological divisions of Indian 
communism, which resulted in various splits in the past half-century. 
[Table 1] 
JNU politics is however not exclusively the prerogative of secular politics, and student groups 
with ethnic nationalist ideologies can also be found.92 For example, in October 2014, a raucous campus 
protest was organized by Hindu nationalist groups such as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP 
– the Indian Students’ Association), a student outfit associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS – the National Volunteer Corps). The protests followed a seminar on “Mahishasur Shahadat Diwas” 
(Mahishasur Martyrdom Day) by a group of Dalit and Other Backward Classes (OBC) students,93 who 
described this mythological figure (traditionally portrayed in Hindu mythology as a demon from the Yadav 
caste killed by goddess Durga) as an allegory of upper caste social oppression.94 
More importantly, the implementation of new affirmative action mechanisms (referred to as 
‘reservations’) in higher education has led to a fierce resistance.95 In 2006, a new campus-based political 
outfit, Youth for Equality, particularly active at JNU, emerged in opposition to caste-based reservation 
and in support of “merit”96 and the enforcement of admission quotas based exclusively on economic and 
gender disparities rather than on caste divides.97 This followed the Congress-led government decision to 
extend reservation for OBCs to educational institutions funded by the central authorities.98 Before 1990, 
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an existing 15 percent reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 7.5 per cent quota for Scheduled Tribes 
(STs) was in place.99 A section of the upper castes at JNU and beyond reacted furiously to this measure; 
according to some reports more than 150 students attempted to immolate themselves in different 
incidents of protest across India.100 
While the distinctive political character of JNU is an established fact, the reasons for its endurance 
over the years – amidst a changing, and increasingly hostile political landscape – remain uncertain. Thus, 
we are now interested in describing how cultures of participation at JNU are potentially reproductive, 
notably through the daily actions of micro-cohorts of activists.  
The Passing Down of a Culture: A Qualitative Account of Political Socialization in JNU 
The historical record of JNU student politics indicates that a section of JNU students, whether right-wing 
or left-wing, display ostensibly high levels of politicization. When visiting JNU, it is easy to witness that 
cohorts of activist students personally engage with political issues on an everyday basis. Interviews and 
accounts of politically active residents indicate that they attach political meaning to various university 
spaces. It is where students “have planned revolution as well as found romance” says Sandeep Singh, 
former Student Union president.101 Kavita Krishnan, 1995 JNU Student Union Joint Secretary reflects on 
her experience at JNU; “for an introverted and intensely private person, it was exhilarating to discover a 
world of warm solidarity, collectivity and comradeship created in the course of late-night debates at the 
dhabas (food stall), marching in torch-light processions, writing leaflets and organizing movements.102 
[Table 2] 
Professorial contributions to the political debate are also apparent. The JNU faculty often recruits 
academics who were politically active during their own education. Based on our research on the patterns 
of JNU activism, Table 2 shows that the majority (60.4 percent) of those who had held important Student 
Union positions during their student life joined academia after graduation. Data was collected and 
crosschecked through conducting interviews of former JNU student leaders.103 This passage of politically 
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active students to academic positions also contributes to the reproduction of an environment that values 
political discussions, both in classes and in evening canteen meetings. One JNU professor reflects that “so 
for me having been a student activist, it was a natural transition to being a teachers’ activist.”104  
Another crucial aspect lies in the fact that the everyday routine at JNU tends to abolish the 
distinction between social and political activities on campus. Political events organized under the banner 
of student organizations include various leisurely venues that cannot be seen only as part of a pre-
electoral campaign. Reading and music events, film screenings, street plays, memorial lectures, and 
workshops are organized on a nearly daily basis and involve a high degree of intra-organization 
competition.105 Pamphlet distribution and poster-making also play an important role in student 
interaction. For instance, during the year 2015 only, there were a total of 392 posters posted on the walls 
all around the campus. 
Beyond electoral politics, political organizations aspire to occupy public spaces and provide 
political interpretations of cultural and religious artifacts such as festivals (e.g. the Hindu celebration 
Durga Puja), Hindu scriptures, popular cinema, or flag hoisting on Independence Day. As a senior activist 
puts it, “there is no pause in the political game”106 and this puts most proactive activists under constant 
pressure, as they need to reach out all day and all night long.  
Acknowledgement of political effervescence can take various forms; one activist-professor of JNU 
talks about a space of conscientisation; an elected leader boldly claims that JNU “taught him 
everything.”107 Ethnographic evidence shows that activists constantly relate to JNU as a founding 
experience in their political apprenticeship. As a former JNU student reflects, “Jawaharlal Nehru 
University is always a Dickensian scenario. Imagine 1968 Paris being repeated over and over again – the 
slogans, the sexual liberation, the orgasmic enthusiasm for revolution, the wild dreams.”108  
There are critical moments in the academic year in which the processes of socialization and 
politicization are so entangled that they become inseparable. We describe below how these ‘moments’ 
relate to the day-to-day activities led by activists for students facing various kinds of hardships, 
administrative conundrums and personal adversities. JNU activists’ patronage and readiness to address 
12 
 
student issues – which are fueled by the hope of generating sustained political loyalties – can be 
considered one of the principal mechanisms of politicization on campus.  
During the ten day registration period when newcomer students officially sign-up for their 
programs of study, activist students make their initial contact with the arriving students. Activists 
welcome newcomers by offering help to get acquainted with the JNU campus as well as by providing 
assistance for the red-tape necessary for registration. Competing cohorts of activists camp in front of the 
administrative offices for the so-called “registration assistance.”109 The official rationale behind this is to 
facilitate the bureaucratic work for registration, but it also gives activists the opportunity to establish ties 
with the newcomer students. 
At a more individual level, activists appeal to the administration when scholarships are not paid 
on time or when an administrative deadlock prevents a student from completing a bureaucratic task. 
Student activists, especially those who have held Student Union offices, may book lecture rooms for 
student seminars and public events, help students to shift their hostel (dormitory) rooms, influence 
decisions on campus shop-allotment, and put students in contact with the appropriate administrators 
depending on their query. They can also speed up diverse administrative queries. Discourses on the 
administration are acrimonious but interpersonal relations with administrative personnel need to be 
harmonious in order to “fix” student demands. 
Some activists are also perceived as authoritative elders. These activists have the implicit 
responsibility to solve personal problems of students, including various kinds of conflicts. Issues might be 
related to family pressure, academic performance, sentimental spleen, intimate partner violence or 
injuries. Becoming a student activist at JNU is not only about getting involved in student politics; it is also 
about incorporating human skills that enable oneself to act like a mentor for students. In this respect, the 
task of assisting individuals at a personal level and mass mobilization of students become complementary, 
if not intertwined. Reflections of a former activist highlights this aspect; “after some time, you have 
internalized that the rule of the game is to keep contact with people until it reaches an amazing level. It 
is not like a last minute tactical plan to talk to people and get them to vote. If you want to ensure 
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participation you need to keep contact with students all the time.”110 As the following quote suggests, 
campus activists are not only promoting ideals in line with their ideology but also behaving as middle-
men or “street level bureaucrats”111 who are ready to assist students – though sometimes reluctantly – 
in their mundane personal queries. 
Young students, they are confused, you help them. Even the smaller battles give 
you satisfaction […] JNUSU [JNU Students’ Union] leaders have their own 
strength in terms of what they do better, someone will be a good speech maker, 
someone will be good with students on one-to-one basis, some will be good in 
terms of political sharpness. Someone again will be better at negotiating with the 
administration […] meeting with professors and getting things done […] in JNU a 
lot of people come from small villages, from tribal areas, they live with Rs.3000 
a month and still send back to their parents. They come with so much fear, lack 
of confidence in themselves […] You have to be available for them, counsel them, 
solve their problems, you have to care about people’s sensibilities, all the range 
of sensibilities […] if you want to say ‘I will represent you’ [...] SL [undergraduates 
of the School of Languages] kids are the sweetest, because for them you are like 
didi, bhaia, [i.e. elder sister, brother] you become elder sister, elder brother, you 
take care of them. (First author interview with a former JNU Student Union 
president, 2015) 
As it appears, campus activists at JNU give away their time and energy in the hope of securing 
political loyalties. They do not solely carry out patronage-dispensing acts out of genuine concern and 
empathy for student problems. They are also conscious that if they do not deliver, the individual will seek 
assistance from rival activists. In this sense, it is possible to spot similar variants of JNU campus activists 
elsewhere in Indian politics who assume the role of an intermediary. Such brokers are central to how 
Indian democracy operates,112 and the democratic space of JNU is no exception to this general pattern. 
As Piliavsky and Berenschot identify,113 patron-client relationships in the South Asian context are not only 
a matter of redistributing resources, they are also a rhetorical act that convey largesse as a politician’s 
virtue.  
As supported by the two quotes that follow, clientelist features of student politics at JNU provide 
crucial mechanisms for recruiting new members as well as for building connections at the individual level, 
thus activating the process of political socialization. A student activist who has held offices in a political 
organization reveals his process of stepping into student politics: “I got involved in JNU politics for petty 
reasons. I wanted to shift to Narmada [hostel name] and leave the cranky room in Mahi Mandavi. The 
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AISA114 activist helped me to do that, and through prolonged discussion I got into politics.”115 This 
suggests a complex political socialization process that is beyond traditional patron-client relationships 
based on receiving benefits in exchange for giving loyalty. 
Political groups at JNU are successful in recruiting new committed members through creating ties 
of solidarity and friendship with the younger generation. Socialization, in this sense, plays a crucial role 
in the formation of a collective identity and the progressive familiarization of the newcomer into the 
group.116 The enlarged group would campaign in teams, enjoy free time together, drink alcohol in the 
secrecy of a comrade’s room and even get high under the same tree on the day of Holi (festival).  
A second ‘socialization moment’ entailing practices of micro-politics is tied to the practice of 
“room sheltering.” Because of the rapid expansion of the number of students in the past decade, the 
amount of free spaces available in the 17 hostels of the campus is increasingly insufficient to host all the 
new incomers. Many freshers therefore end up in the rooms of activists who generously offer them some 
space where they can stay until they are allotted a hostel room.  
One SFI senior was sheltering two freshers in his room. They were becoming 
sympathizers slowly, slowly. But he was not setting an example. He was ordering 
pizza every day instead of going to the mess and meeting common students, 
interacting […] So, in addition of being elitist he was not relating to students in 
his own hostel […] and then he wanted the unit to win student elections! […] 
AISA on the other hand will ask you what you like, your favorite poems, your 
family situation. They take you for chai, “Oh you read Neruda?” […] and then 
slowly they will connect this with larger ideological issues […] If you want to be a 
serious activist in JNU, you need to know at least 2,000 people, not only their 
name, but everything about their life […] Being an activist in JNU entails personal 
sacrifices, abandoning one’s private life in order to be available for students all 
the time. As I told you, the classic strategy is to offer a room to freshers […] and 
this is what I did, four people for so many months, it was horrible. [These 
sacrifices] show your sincerity to politics, and this is what people vote for.  All 
these things are linked […] when you are not visible, you connect less […] and 
ultimately you are less comfortable with public speaking. Because AISA were 
more hard-working, dedicated […] because of that they were more prepared for 
public speaking. (First author interview with a former activist, 2016) 
At the beginning of the academic year, an activist can shelter up to four new students. This 
situation usually lasts for months and provides an influential space for personal discussions on political 
matters. Student leaders introduce their value system to the new arrivals and encourage them to 
participate in public events. Only after his first week at JNU, Akhil, a newcomer student staying in the 
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room of a senior activist, declared to the ethnographer that “we are having a protest at bloc this 
afternoon.” Akhil’s choice of the word “we” shows how he has already identified himself as a member of 
a politically active group. Later in the month, the ethnographer would meet the fresher Sunil near 
Godawari tea stall. Sunil would confess that it was his first time ever putting a political poster of AISA on 
a wall. Later on, the ethnographer would meet him several times in the hostel room of a dynamic cadre 
of the same organization, where he stays with three other new students. Socialization, once again, acts 
as a vehicle of politics and vice-versa. 
Campus appears here as a safe territory117 in which JNU students are exposed to new political 
languages and understandings of society.118 Freshers are invited to loci amoeni and havens;119 these 
pleasant closed spaces enable individuals to express their personality and to learn the political line of the 
organization through loosely structured face-to-face discussions with affiliated seniors. The setting is 
formally non-hierarchical but the authority of the senior prevails and the junior learns quickly the specific 
knowledge and the lexicon legitimizing the political credos of a specific organization. Respondents very 
often refer to influential political activists as elder brothers or sisters when they are asked to recall their 
own consciousness-raising process.120 Before concluding the discussion on the centrality of socialization 
in fueling politicization in JNU, we turn to the analysis of survey data in order to quantify the phenomenon 
at hand.   
HOW MUCH MORE POLITICAL? QUANTIFYING POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AT JNU 
As the preceding qualitative discussion suggests, student organizations at JNU generate a process of 
political socialization, which is pursued through both patronage relations and sustained interactions with 
newcomer students. In this sense, student organizations contribute to the fashioning and the 
reproduction of politicized micro-cohorts121 and produce political gains. Overall, one politicized cohort of 
senior political activists helps in forging a new one.  
The ethnographic part of this study highlights the mechanism but it does not tell how widespread 
the political socialization is.122 In other words, is political socialization experienced only by a small 
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proportion of JNU students or is it a broad phenomenon? If this mechanism is widespread among JNU 
students, then we should be able to observe differences among students based on how long they have 
been exposed to the JNU environment. Similarly, students who reside on campus are more exposed to 
the political environment at JNU than those who reside off-campus. As a result, on-campus residents 
should have a higher level of politicization than students living off-campus. Following this line of thought, 
we formulate and test the validity of four hypotheses based on the ethnographic study. 
Hypothesis 1 Exposure to the JNU campus makes a student more likely to self-place herself in a 
radical position on the left-right political spectrum. 
Hypothesis 2 Students who have been studying longer at JNU are more likely to become 
members of a political organization. 
Hypothesis 3 The longer a student has been studying in JNU, the higher the likelihood that she 
participates in political events. 
Hypothesis 4 Students who are living on campus are more susceptible to politicization than those 
who reside off-campus. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
We are interested in the effects of continued exposure to the JNU campus on the political attitudes of 
students. In this sense, our treatment is exposure to the JNU campus. One possible approach is to 
compare political attitudes of JNU students with non-JNU students or the larger population. However, 
such an approach essentially introduces empirical problems because the treatment is dependent on 
enrollment at JNU, which is not randomly assigned. In such an empirical design, students would have self-
placed themselves in the treatment group by choosing to enroll at JNU. 
As conventional wisdom and our previous fieldwork suggests, some students join or refrain from 
enrolling at JNU precisely because of the political environment at JNU. To circumvent this selection 
problem, we limit our population to JNU students and compare JNU students with other JNU students. 
Our treatment, exposure to the JNU campus, is measured as time spent at JNU, in terms of semesters. 
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We expect that those JNU students who have spent more academic semesters at JNU are more likely to 
become politicized. 
Our theoretical expectations are tested on a survey carried out in the JNU campus over six weeks 
in the first semester of the 2014-15 academic year. It was conducted by the first author and all of the 
respondents were JNU students. Although the medium of education in JNU is English, a simple English 
language was adopted to ensure that comprehension was not an issue. The questionnaire was restricted 
to a single (double-sided) page in order to encourage participation by keeping the questionnaire short. It 
consisted of 15 structured and two open-ended questions. Respondents were briefed and it was 
emphasized that all responses were strictly anonymous. The questionnaire was filled by the respondent 
and placed in an opaque ballot box. 
The questionnaire was distributed in every student hall on campus. In addition, over six weeks 
during the first semester of the academic year 2014-15, five visits to four types of locations were made; 
(1) all the university libraries, (2) all the 15 university buildings where teaching takes place, (3) all the 
school canteens, (4) the main squares/forecourts and vicinities of on-campus tea stalls. A time-slot was 
randomly assigned (in terms of the day of the week and time, considering only teaching hours) for a visit 
to a location. In addition, a more specific locality was randomly assigned if the location was a large 
building such as a main library or teaching center. For example, we visited teaching building A and 
delivered questionnaires on Tuesday at 10 am in the classrooms located on the second floor. 
Outcome Variables 
1- Self-Placement on the Political Spectrum 
We rely on a question in our survey that asks respondents to self-place themselves on the left-right 
political spectrum. The respective survey question is depicted in Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
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Based on this question, we create two outcome variables for testing our first hypothesis. Our 
strategy is depicted in Table 4. First, a binary variable labeled Radical takes a true value for students who 
placed themselves on 1-3 or 8-10 and false otherwise. Second, we create an ordinal variable, called 
Radicalization, which measures how far the respondent is from the center. We define answers 5 and 6 as 
the center of the political spectrum. Accordingly, answers 4 and 7 are considered relative centrist; 3 and 
8 are relative radical; 2 and 9 are radicals; 1 and 10 are extreme radicals. We consider those who respond 
as “Don’t know/No opinion” as non-radical and non-political. However, excluding these responses from 
the analysis does not change our results, as shown in the appendix. 
[Table 4] 
2- Membership in a Political organization 
We propose that exposure to the JNU campus makes a student more likely to become a member of a 
political organization. In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on a question in the survey that asks 
respondents whether they are a member of a political organization or not. We build the outcome variable 
Membership based on this question. 
3- Participation in Political Events 
Our final hypothesis proposes that exposure to the JNU campus makes students more likely to participate 
in political events. In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on three questions in the survey that ask 
participants how frequently they participate in, donate to and organize political events. Based on these 
questions, we build an ordinal variable labeled Participation that categorizes the level of participation. 
The five categories of Participation are depicted in Table 5. 
[Table 5] 
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Main Explanatory Variables 
Our main explanatory variable is exposure to the JNU campus, which is measured in semesters of study 
as a JNU student. We present our results in number of semesters for easier interpretation, but different 
functional forms for study time, including natural log or a quadratic term do not change our results. As 
some postgraduate students spend more semesters at JNU, distribution of this variable is highly skewed. 
There are a few outliers (2.25 percent of the respondents) who spent more than 12 semesters at JNU. 
Dropping or including these respondents do not change our results in a meaningful way. We illustrate our 
results with these outliers lumped at the value 13 for the semester of study. The number of students in 
their odd semesters is also considerably higher than students in their even semesters (irregular students) 
because the survey was conducted in the first semester of an academic year. In order to make sure that 
this imbalance does not introduce estimation problems, we also considered academic years of study. 
Again, our results do not change whether we measure academic years of study or semesters of study. We 
present the models with alternative measures for study time in the online appendix. 
Our ethnographic study suggests that on-campus dormitories are hotbeds for political 
socialization. We have asked students whether they are living on-campus in student accommodation or 
residing outside the campus. Based on this question in our survey, we generate the variable hostel, which 
captures the residential status of the student. 
Control Variables 
There is no recent quantitative study on campus politics in India. The last ones are the works of Pattnaik 
and Hazary,123 who followed the legacy of previous surveys on Indian university students.124 This tradition 
investigated the background of politically active students, their political attitudes and their organizational 
affiliation. Unfortunately, this literature does not provide an established baseline model to follow as it 
did not examine the impact of the university campus on political identities and participation. However, 
considering our experience of Indian campus politics we introduce several control variables that have the 
potential to influence political attitudes.  
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First, we consider the class of the respondent as potentially influential. We have several questions 
in the survey that can be used as a proxy for class. As these indicators provide similar results, we only 
present the level of education of the respondent’s guardian/parent. Second, we control for meta-castes 
– i.e. conglomerates of different jatis (castes) – by using the category of admission as a proxy.125 We 
consider three main admission categories; general (non-reserved), OBC (Other Backward Classes) and 
SC/ST (Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe). In the Indian context, caste does not necessarily overlap with 
class or income, and it is imperative to differentiate social and economic stigmas.126 Third, we control for 
whether the respondent’s guardian resides in urban, sub-urban or rural areas. Fourth, we control for 
gender because gender can have an influence on political behavior. In line with other Indian scholarship, 
we strongly suspect that being female may have a negative impact on participation and membership. 
Fifth, the birthplace of the respondent is taken into account. We have clustered responses into seven 
categories; Northern states127 (excluding the capital), Delhi NCR, West Bengal, Southern states,128 North 
East,129 Jammu and Kashmir and abroad.130 Sixth, we control for school of enrollment because the JNU 
campus might offer different experiences to students with different majors.  
We acknowledge years of education and age as possible confounding variables. In our view, 
neither age nor years of education necessarily positively affect the likelihood of being a political radical, 
membership to a political organization, or participation in political events. Nevertheless, we include the 
degree of enrollment variable (undergraduate, master’s level or MPhil/PhD) to capture the effect of years 
of education. Finally, we add religious beliefs in some of our models. Interpretation of this variable should 
be performed with caution because it is likely to introduce post-treatment bias; exposure to JNU might 
influence religious views. We also control for age as a robustness check to see whether any impact we 
might find would be washed away with the introduction of age. Our results substantively remain the same 
when we control for age (see the appendix). 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest are provided in Table 6. The main explanatory variable, 
the semester of study at JNU, ranges from 1 to 13 with a mean of 3.35 (the academic year is divided into 
two semesters). The variable is skewed to the left, which is compatible with the student population of 
JNU. Membership to a political organization is at 23 percent, and 44 percent of respondents place 
themselves on a radical position in the political spectrum. As many of our variables are categorical, 
summary statistics are not interpretable for all of the variables. We provide histograms for each variable 
in the appendix in order to illustrate how the variables are distributed. 
[Table 6] 
Political Radicalization 
As the first step for the empirical analysis, we test the hypothesis proposing that more time spent as a 
JNU student increases the likelihood of political radicalization. We use logistic regression on the binary 
variable Radical. We present our full model in Table 7. We estimate that the average marginal effect of 
every additional semester at JNU on the likelihood of self-placement at a radical position on the political 
spectrum is 2.0 percentage points. In other words, every additional semester spent at JNU is associated 
with 2.0 percentage points increase in the likelihood of perceiving oneself as radical on average. This 
result suggests that a student who has spent 4 academic years at JNU is 16.0 percentage points more 
likely to self-place herself at a radical position on the political spectrum than a student in her first 
semester at JNU.  
[Table 7] 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between semesters as a JNU student and likelihood of radical 
self-placement. As semesters of study at JNU increase, the probability of drifting from ‘centrist’ positions 
increases. The average marginal effect of on-campus accommodation on being in the radical category is 
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0.21, which is consistent with our expectations. To better illustrate this effect, the average of the 
predicted probability of being in the radical category is 0.36, according to our model. Had no student 
stayed in a hostel, the predicted probability is 0.18. Had everyone stayed in a hostel, the predicted 
probability is 0.39. The change of probability from 0.18 to 0.39 (0.39 – 0.18 = 0.21) is the estimated effect 
of on-campus residence. We present the model in which we included our explanatory variables without 
an interaction term but the introduction of an interaction term yields the same substantive results. An 
interaction term between Semester of Study and Hostel would assume that students who are residing in 
campus accommodations in the first term of the 2014-2015 academic year have also been living on-
campus throughout their education at JNU. This might be unlikely but even if we make this assumption, 
our results stay the same substantively. 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between predicted probability of being in the radical category 
and the variables of interest 
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We do not find a statistically significant effect for parent’s study level, gender, caste (proxied by 
admission criteria), level of study (undergraduate/postgraduate). Compared to respondents coming from 
an urban background, respondents with a rural origin are more likely to self-place themselves at a radical 
position.  
Thus, it appears that self-perceived radicalization at JNU is an all-encompassing phenomenon 
regardless of caste, gender and school of enrollment. Nevertheless, students from rural backgrounds are 
more likely to radicalize than other sections of the student population. It is commonly accepted that 
students from upper classes have higher chances of having an urban background.131 It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that “urban elites” are less likely to radicalize compared to other sections of the 
JNU population.  
Atheists are 26 percentage points more likely to be politically radical compared to Hindus but we 
do not consider a causal link between the two variables because it is quite plausible that there is a 
common cause for both self-placing in left fringes of the political spectrum and defining oneself as atheist. 
There are also differences in terms of school type; School of Social Sciences (SSS) students are more likely 
to perceive themselves as radicals than School of International Studies (SIS) and Combined Schools (CS) 
students. Foreign students are less likely to be radical than any other type of admission students.  
The effect of time spent as a JNU student remains robust to different model specifications. Even 
when we control for age, the effect of time spent at JNU remains positive and statistically significant. 
When we move towards different restricted models, the number of semesters at JNU remains always 
positive and statistically significant. We only present results for our selected model in Table 7 because we 
consider this model as the most theoretically informed way of modelling the data generation process in 
our case. The model also performs best in comparison with alternative ones in terms of AIC and BIC 
criteria. However, the full model leads to a substantial decline in number of observations due to listwise 
deletion of missing observations. Consequently, it causes wider confidence intervals even though the 
estimated coefficients and marginal effects do not change substantially. Restricted models return similar 
predicted probabilities for being a radical when we consider the effect of semesters of study but with 
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considerably shorter confidence intervals than presented in Figure 1. For alternative model specifications 
and unrestricted models, please see the additional online appendix. 
[Table 8] 
Next, we measure our dependent variable, political radicalization, as an ordinal variable (see 
Table 4). Higher numbers in the radicalization variable show higher distance from the center of the 
political spectrum. We use the same model specification strategy.  These results are in line with the 
previous results for dichotomous measurement of radicalization. The coefficient for semesters of study 
at JNU is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01) (see Table 8). The average marginal effect of 
variables of interest are presented at Table 9. The predicted probability of being in the Full Centrist 
category is around 0.33 for students who have started their first semester at JNU, but it substantially 
drops as the semesters of study increase. For students who have spent 8 semesters at JNU, the predicted 
probability of being in the Full Centrist category drops to 0.26.  
As a student spends more and more semesters at JNU, his or her probability of being in the 
‘Extreme Radical’ category increases. The predicted probability of being in the Extreme Radical category 
is 0.07 for those who are in their first semester at JNU. This probability increases to 0.12 after spending 
8 semesters. Students who reside on-campus, on average, are more likely to be in a more radical category. 
Overall, statistical analysis suggests strong support for our first hypothesis; exposure to the JNU campus 
is associated with an increased likelihood of political radicalization. 
[Table 9] 
Membership to a Political Organization 
We claim that exposure to the JNU campus increases the likelihood of membership to a political 
organization. This hypothesis is tested using the dichotomous Membership variable, which records 
whether the respondent is a member of a political organization. We use the same model specification as 
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we think that this specification is the most theoretically informed one. The result for logistic regression 
on Membership is presented in Table 10. We estimate the average marginal effect of every additional 
semester at JNU on the likelihood of membership to a political organization as 0.02. Similarly, residing in 
on-campus accommodation increases the probability of being a member of a political organization by 
0.13, on average. Again, results are robust to different model specifications. Even controlling for age does 
not substantially change this result, as our main explanatory variable remains positive and statistically 
significant. 
We find no relationship between membership to a political organization and caste, parent’s level 
of study, gender, urban/rural background, and degree of enrollment. There is no difference between 
enrollment in SSS, SIS and SL in terms of the likelihood of affiliation to a political organization, but students 
of CS are less likely to become members of a political organization compared to SSS and SL. 
[Table 10] 
The limited affiliation levels of CS students might be partly because of the remote location of 
their academic buildings within the JNU campus, which reduces exposure to the political environment of 
the campus. Atheists and Muslims are more likely to be affiliated to an organization than Hindus. 
Additionally, students from the North East (i.e. the eastern-most region of India) are less likely to be 
politically affiliated than those who were born in the rest of North India. This probably indicates a lack of 
social integration to broader political activities in the JNU campus. 
It should be noted that the statistical model is likely to overestimate the true effect of exposure 
to the JNU campus on membership to a political organization because students might be less likely to 
become a member of any organization when they have recently settled for their studies. Only after 
spending some time, students make social connections, which might influence their likelihood of 
membership to any social association. In addition, students who become members of a political 
organization may also become more likely to prefer staying at JNU for further study (e.g. post-graduate 
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study) due to their close social ties at JNU. Such a censoring mechanism may also contribute to the 
generation of the data we observe. 
Overall, the statistical result on membership is far from conclusive. We acknowledge that this 
model does not uncover a causal link between exposure to the JNU campus and membership to a political 
organization in itself. However, coupled with the ethnographic study and our other statistical inference, 
the model on membership to a political organization paints a more complete picture. This result is in line 
with our other empirical findings and it fits very well into the general framework provided by the 
ethnographic study. 
Participation in Political Events 
We hypothesize that exposure to the JNU campus increases the frequency of participation in political 
events. We test this hypothesis through ordinal logit on the Participation variable, which categorizes 
respondents into five categories from no participation to always/daily participation. The results are 
presented in Table 11. Our main explanatory variables, semesters at JNU and residence on campus, are 
positive and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that participation in political events become more likely as a 
student is more exposed to the JNU campus. Again, this finding is robust to different model specifications, 
including controlling for respondents’ age (see Table 12). 
[Table 11] 
[Table 12] 
We do not find any evidence that admission status influences participation in political events. 
Similarly, we find no effect for parent’s study level and the degree of enrollment.132 Females however are 
considerably less likely to participate in political events. On average, the predicted probability of being in 
the highest two participation categories is 0.12 lower for females than males. This result also fits well 
with the established literature on gender and politics in India, which highlights the gender bias in Indian 
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politics.133 Respondents from rural and sub-urban backgrounds are more likely to participate in political 
events compared to respondents with an urban background. Students enrolled in CS are less likely to 
participate in political events than students of SSS but we do not find any difference between SSS and SIS 
and between SSS and SL. Those who identified themselves as atheists are more likely to participate than 
Hindus, which is compatible with our results regarding political radicalization. A negative coefficient 
suggests that Muslims are less likely to participate than Hindus but the result is statistically insignificant. 
Our results suggest that birthplace of the respondent is not very influential on the frequency of 
participation. 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between frequency of political participation and semesters of 
study at JNU 
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CONCLUSION 
We have argued that continuous interactions between political activists and newcomer students across 
JNU student communities do prompt a political socialization process in which newcomer students 
become more and more politicized, if not themselves versed in political activism. The recent broad-based 
mobilization of students in JNU after the arrest – on charges of sedition – of the Students’ Union President 
and two other student activists,134 can be seen in line with the finding of this article. Further research will 
assess whether peer-to-peer value-based politicization of youth is found pervasive in other premium 
universities, as suggested by the recent occurrence of several campus-based mobilizations – i.e. the 
Hokkolorob movement,135 ‘FTII protest’,136 Rohith Vemula agitation137 and various anti-moral policing 
initiatives around the country.138 
As an interrelated finding, our analysis indicates that while campus politics is mainly informed by 
dynamics of social relations, the latter are not chiefly manifested in the assertion of caste and class 
identities. This result contrasts with most political accounts of educational institutions in Uttar Pradesh,139 
Tamil Nadu,140 and across India in general in which the relevance of caste identities and caste-based 
politics is far from obsolete. Such a result does not mean however that these identities are unimportant 
parameters, irrelevant to the political grammar of student organizations in JNU. For instance, fieldwork 
evidence suggests that caste is one of the factors determining the selection of candidates for student 
elections. It also orients to a certain extent the content of campaigning political messages addressed to 
individual students.  
Nevertheless, the article indicates that activist groups are capable of drawing students from 
different horizons into politics – even though students from elite backgrounds show less interest in 
political participation. While caste is not a crucial explanatory factor driving youth political participation 
in JNU, caste identities presumably remain important as students’ political commitments are understood 
and negotiated differently according to one’s background. Significantly, student politics on campus is led 
by a section of the student population member of political organizations that are regional in their 
composition and affiliated to broader Indian parties.  
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One limitation of our study is worth underlining; our empirical results are based on a single case 
study. Although JNU is a crucial case as a flagship university and a standard bearer of student politics in 
India, we caution the reader not to hastily generalize our findings beyond the context of JNU at this stage 
of research.141 What is needed are cross-case studies that exploit variations at the subnational level, while 
assessing both the contributions of elite and non-elite universities in the shaping of political values and 
activist careers. Further research would also benefit from adopting a longitudinal approach. Following 
participants over several years, especially after graduation and into adulthood, would enable us to see 
whether political socialization has a lasting effect. 
Keeping these two limitations in mind, we suggest that the originality of the paper is twofold. 
First, JNU presents a “most likely case” within which political socialization is not drawn along caste and 
class lines. Such socialization, based on the passing down of political knowledge from older activist 
cohorts to younger ones, overrides in part caste and class alignments by drawing into politics students 
who have inherited different parental political views and are from eclectic socio-economic backgrounds. 
As these are the factors that are overwhelmingly emphasized by the extant literature on youth politics in 
India, we appear to present a valuable counterpoint to the dominant understanding.  
Second, this is the first attempt to measure the effect of campus presence on reshaping one’s 
political identity in the Indian context. We consider this research endeavor as a necessary step to situate 
Indian student politics on the global map of studies on youth politics. While interrogating some commonly 
accepted patterns of Indian youth politics, the article shows that the case of JNU student politicization 
conforms to the causal framework described in the wider literature, namely that elite institutions in the 
social sciences tend to favor the emergence of political activism.  
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139 Craig Jeffrey, Timepass: Youth, Class, and the Politics of Waiting in India (Stanford University Press, 2010). 
140 Ajantha Subramanian, “Making Merit: The Indian Institutes of Technology and the Social Life of Caste,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.57, No.2 (2015), pp.291-322. 
141 We thank our anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Political Affiliation of Elected Presidents of JNU Student Union since 1974 
Student Organization  Parent Political Party  Number  of Presidents 
SFI  CPI-M  22 (52.38%) 
AISA  CPI-ML  9 (21.43%) 
AISF  CPI  1 (2.38%) 
NSUI  INC (Congress)  1 (2.38%) 
ABVP  RSS  1 (2.38%) 
Other (Non-affiliated org.)  None (Ind. or renegade)  8 (19.05%) 
Total    42 (100%) 
The main elected student organizations are: 
AISA: All India Students Association, student branch of Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist CPI-ML, SFI: 
Students’ Federation of India, student branch of Communist Party of India Marxist CPI-M, 
AISF: All India Students Federation, student branch of Communist Party of India CPI, 
ABVP: Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, student wing of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh RSS, NSUI: National 
Students’ Union Of India, student branch of the Indian National Congress. 
Other student organizations in JNU are: 
DSF: Democratic Students’ Federation, associated to Left Collective, 
DSU: Democratic Students Union, supporter of the Communist Party of India Maoist CPI(Maoist), UDSF: United Dalit 
Students’ Forum, sympathizer of the Bahujan Samaj Party BSP. 
Source: fieldwork 
 
Table 2: Occupations of JNU Student Union Office Holders After Leaving Office (1971-2014) 
 
Politician       Academic      Journalist     Social Worker          Other         Still Studying         Total 
 
       
          19 (18.8%)    61 (60.4%)     9  (8.9%) 6 (5.9%)         16 (15.8%)       15 (12.9%)       126   (100%) 
 
 
Post-office occupations of students who have held one of the following positions: President, Vice-President (post 
created in 1978 only), General Secretary and Joint Secretary (also created in 1978). No elections were held between 
2008 and 2012. Individuals elected several times and to different posts are counted once. 
Source: fieldwork 
 
Table 3: Survey Question for Measuring Political Radicalization 
 
On the political spectrum I consider myself: 
Extreme Left Extreme Right 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  □ Don’t know / No opinion   
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Table 4: Outcome Variables for Political Radicalization 
Political Spectrum Self-Placement Radical (Binary) Radicalization (Ordinal) 
  Don’t know / No opinion   False (0) Non-political (0) 
— — —   — 5 & 6 —    — — — False (0) Full Centrist (1) 
— — — 4 —   & — 7 — — — False (0) Relative Centrist (2) 
— — 3 — —   & —    — 8 — — True (1) Relative Radical (3) 
— 2 —   — —   & —    —   — 9 — True (1) Radical (4) 
1 — —   — —   & —    —   — — 10 True (1) Extreme Radical (5) 
 
Table 5: Outcome Variable for Participation in Political Events 
Frequency of Political Participation Participation (Ordinal) 
No participation 0 
Rare/low participation 1 
Occasional participation 2 
Regular participation 3 
Always/daily participation 4 
 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics  
Variable Type Mean Std.  Dev. Min. Max. N 
Radical outcome 0.36 0.48 0 1 1074 
Radicalization outcome 2.00 1.59 0 5 1074 
Membership outcome 0.23 0.42 0 1 1155 
Participation outcome 1.23 1.3 0 4 1022 
Semester of Study main explanatory 3.35 2.92 1 13 934 
Hostel main explanatory 0.81 0.39 0 1 934 
Highest Degree Earned by Parent control 3.46 1.62 0 5 978 
Female control 0.44 0.5 0 1 1121 
Admission Category control 1.87 0.90 1 4 1006 
Urban/Rural control 1.88 0.88 1 3 941 
School Type control 2.31 1.13 1 4 1088 
Enrollment Type control 2.26 0.71 1 3 1119 
Religion control 1.72 1.07 1 4 1041 
Birth Place control 2.29 1.68 1 7 909 
Age control 23.77 3.70 16 50 1025 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression on Radical 
 Coefficient  Av.  Marginal Effects 
Semester of Study 0.09** (0.04)  0.02** (0.01) 
Hostel 1.21*** (0.35)  0.21*** (0.05) 
Highest Degree Earned by Parent -0.04 (0.07)  -0.01 (0.01) 
Female 0.27 (0.24)  0.05 (0.05) 
Admission Category    
General (baseline)    
Other Backward Classes (OBC) -0.38 (0.24)  -0.07 (0.05) 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) -0.49 (0.33)  -0.10 (0.06) 
Foreign/Other -2.10** (0.83)  -0.31*** (0.07) 
Urban/Rural    
Urban(baseline)      
Sub-Urban 0.11 (0.30)  0.02 (0.06) 
Rural 0.51* (0.26)  0.10* (0.05) 
School Type      
School of Social Sciences (baseline)      
School of International Studies (SIS) -0.65** (0.33)  -0.13** (0.06) 
School of Languages (SL) -0.28 (0.32)  -0.06 (0.06) 
Combined Schools (CS) -0.69** (0.34)  -0.13** (0.06) 
Degree of Enrollment      
Undergraduate(baseline)      
Graduate -0.39 (0.38)  -0.08 (0.08) 
PhD -0.35 (0.39)  -0.07 (0.08) 
Religion      
Hindu (baseline)      
Atheist 1.20*** (0.30)  0.26*** (0.07) 
Muslim 0.43 (0.37)  0.09 (0.08) 
Other -0.23 (0.40)  -0.04 (0.07) 
Birth Place      
Northern states (baseline)      
Delhi NCR 0.27 (0.47)  0.05 (0.09) 
West Bengal 0.12 (0.39)  0.02 (0.08) 
Southern states 0.28 (0.38)  0.05 (0.08) 
North East -0.40 (0.90)  -0.07 (0.15) 
Jammu & Kashmir 1.88** (0.94)  0.38** (0.16) 
Abroad     
Observations 501    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8:  Ordinal Logit on Radicalization 
   
Coefficient 
Semester of Study 0.08*** (0.03) 
Hostel 0.61*** (0.21) 
Highest Degree Earned by Parent -0.03 (0.06) 
Female 
Admission Category 
0.09 (0.18) 
General (baseline)   
Other Backward Classes (OBC) -0.41* (0.21) 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe -0.30 (0.25) 
Foreign/Other -0.72* (0.39) 
Urban/Rural 
Urban(baseline) 
  
Sub-Urban 0.38* (0.21) 
Rural 
School Type 
School of Social Sciences (baseline) 
0.27 (0.24) 
School of International Studies (SIS) -0.68*** (0.25) 
School of Languages (SL) -0.21 (0.26) 
Combined Schools (CS) 
Degree of Enrollment 
Undergraduate(baseline) 
-0.76*** (0.26) 
Graduate -0.30 (0.35) 
PhD 
Religion 
Hindu (baseline) 
-0.19 (0.36) 
Atheist 1.13*** (0.23) 
Muslim 0.17 (0.41) 
Other 
Birth Place 
Northern states (baseline) 
-0.14 (0.28) 
Delhi NCR -0.30 (0.30) 
West Bengal 0.26 (0.31) 
Southern states 0.13 (0.30) 
North East 0.28 (0.27) 
Jammu & Kashmir -0.03 (0.58) 
Abroad 0.31 (0.78)  
Observations 501 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9:  Marginal Effects on Radicalization 
 
Frequency of Participation Category 
                       Non-political Full Centrist Relative Centrist Relative Radical Radical  Extreme Radical  
              Hostel    -0.080***      -0.057***            0.020**         0.048*** 0.031*** 0.038***                                                                                
                    (0.031)             (0.019)          (0.010)         (0.018)          (0.011)              (0.012) 
Semester   -0.010***      -0.009***           0.002*          0.006*** 0.005***     0.006***                                                                                  
                     (0.004)               (0.003)           (0.001)         (0.002) (0.002)               (0.002)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 10: Logistic Regression on Membership 
        Coefficient___             Av.  Marginal Effects 
Semester of Study 0.15*** (0.04)  0.02*** (0.01) 
Hostel 1.11** (0.48)  0.13*** (0.05) 
Highest Degree Earned by Parent 0.05 (0.07)  0.01 (0.01) 
Female -0.42 (0.26)  -0.06 (0.04) 
Admission Category    
General (baseline)    
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 0.10 (0.28)  0.01 (0.04) 
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) 0.51 (0.37)  0.08 (0.06) 
Foreign/Other -0.58 (0.66)  -0.07 (0.07) 
Urban/Rural    
Urban(baseline)      
Sub-Urban -0.19 (0.31)  -0.03 (0.04) 
Rural 0.31 (0.29)  0.05 (0.04) 
School Type      
School of Social Sciences (baseline)      
School of International Studies (SIS) -0.40 (0.41)  -0.06 (0.05) 
School of Languages (SL) 0.20 (0.37)  0.03 (0.06) 
Combined Schools (CS) -1.35*** (0.51)  -0.15*** (0.05) 
Degree of Enrollment      
Undergraduate(baseline)      
Graduate -0.37 (0.40)  -0.05 (0.06) 
PhD -0.14 (0.43)  -0.02 (0.06) 
Religion      
Hindu (baseline)      
Atheist 1.32*** (0.33)  0.21*** (0.06) 
Muslim 1.01*** (0.39)  0.16** (0.07) 
Other 0.44 (0.40)  0.06 (0.06) 
Birth Place      
Northern states (baseline)      
Delhi NCR -0.70 (0.62)  -0.09 (0.07) 
West Bengal -0.08 (0.46)  -0.01 (0.07) 
Southern states 0.57 (0.37)  0.09 (0.06) 
North East -1.40*** (0.54)  -0.16*** (0.05) 
Jammu & Kashmir      
Abroad -0.54 (1.14)  -0.07 (0.14) 
Observations 547 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11:  Ordinal Logit on Participation in Political Events
 
                                                                                                           Coefficient 
Hostel 0.82*** (0.28) 
Semester of Study 0.08*** (0.03) 
Highest Degree Earned by Parent 0.08 (0.06) 
Female 
Admission Category 
-0.99*** (0.21) 
General (baseline)   
Other Backward Classes (OBC) 0.15 (0.22) 
Scheduled  Caste/Scheduled  Tribe 0.26 (0.27) 
Foreign/Other 0.67 (0.46) 
Urban/Rural 
Urban(baseline) 
  
Sub-Urban 0.52** (0.24) 
Rural 
School Type 
School of Social Sciences (baseline) 
0.76*** (0.25) 
School of International Studies (SIS) -0.35 (0.30) 
School of Languages (SL) -0.26 (0.26) 
Combined Schools (CS) 
Degree of Enrollment 
Undergraduate(baseline) 
-0.78** (0.31) 
Graduate -0.44 (0.34) 
PhD 
Religion 
Hindu (baseline) 
-0.31 (0.34) 
Atheist 1.31*** (0.25) 
Muslim -0.15 (0.35) 
Other 
Birth Place 
Northern states (baseline) 
0.08 (0.32) 
Delhi NCR -0.33 (0.39) 
West Bengal 0.01 (0.36) 
Southern states 0.57* (0.32) 
North East -0.65* (0.34) 
Jammu & Kashmir -0.07 (0.66) 
Abroad -0.95 (0.68) 
                      Observations                                      498 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 12:  Marginal Effects on Participation in Political Events 
 
                                                            Frequency of Participation Category 
 None Low Occasional Regular Always 
Hostel -.163*** 
(0.057) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.041**
* (0.014) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
Semester of Study -0.015*** 0.001 0.004** 0.004*** 0.006** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Age as Control 
VARIABLES Radical Radicalization Membership Participation 
Study Time (Semester) 0.08* 0.07** 0.16*** 0.07** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Hostel 1.22*** 0.62*** 1.06** 0.91*** 
 (0.36) (0.22) (0.50) (0.29) 
OBC -0.39 -0.36 0.01 0.15 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.22) 
SC-ST -0.62* -0.38 0.40 0.24 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.38) (0.28) 
Foreign/Other -1.85** -0.76* -0.73 0.36 
 (0.86) (0.46) (0.64) (0.57) 
Sub-Urban 0.05 0.32 -0.29 0.65** 
 (0.31) (0.22) (0.32) (0.26) 
Rural 0.60** 0.34 0.35 0.96*** 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.26) 
Study Level Parent -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
SIS -0.60* -0.72*** -0.48 -0.33 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.42) (0.30) 
SL -0.29 -0.24 0.16 -0.29 
 (0.34) (0.27) (0.39) (0.28) 
CS -0.74** -0.73*** -1.33** -0.91*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.53) (0.32) 
Female 0.35 0.15 -0.53* -0.93*** 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.28) (0.22) 
Graduate -0.64 -0.59 -0.44 -0.69* 
 (0.40) (0.37) (0.46) (0.37) 
PhD/Posgraduate -0.71 -0.58 -0.05 -0.58 
 (0.49) (0.42) (0.58) (0.43) 
Atheist 1.23*** 1.10*** 1.34*** 1.32*** 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.35) (0.27) 
Muslim 0.36 0.11 0.92** -0.18 
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.41) (0.38) 
Other -0.07 -0.14 0.51 0.14 
 (0.41) (0.30) (0.42) (0.34) 
Delhi NCR 0.30 -0.26 -0.66 -0.22 
 (0.48) (0.31) (0.63) (0.40) 
West Bengal 0.11 0.33 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.42) (0.32) (0.50) (0.36) 
Southern states 0.30 0.13 0.76* 0.66* 
 (0.36) (0.31) (0.39) (0.35) 
North East 0.21 0.31 -1.31** -0.73** 
 (0.38) (0.28) (0.53) (0.35) 
Jammu & Kashmir -0.09 0.18  0.03 
 (0.92) (0.63)  (0.72) 
Abroad 1.60 0.24 -0.23 -0.62 
 (0.97) (0.82) (1.14) (0.75) 
Age (logged) 0.83 1.05 -0.78 0.37 
 (1.27) (0.90) (1.43) (0.95) 
Observations 473 473 497 470 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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AGE AS CONTROL 
Table 13: Age as Control 
VARIABLES Radical Radicalization Membership Participation 
Study Time (Semester) 0.08* 0.07** 0.16*** 0.07** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Hostel 1.22*** 0.62*** 1.06** 0.91*** 
 (0.36) (0.22) (0.50) (0.29) 
OBC -0.39 -0.36 0.01 0.15 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.22) 
SC-ST -0.62* -0.38 0.40 0.24 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.38) (0.28) 
Foreign/Other -1.85** -0.76* -0.73 0.36 
 (0.86) (0.46) (0.64) (0.57) 
Sub-Urban 0.05 0.32 -0.29 0.65** 
 (0.31) (0.22) (0.32) (0.26) 
Rural 0.60** 0.34 0.35 0.96*** 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.26) 
Study Level Parent -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
SIS -0.60* -0.72*** -0.48 -0.33 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.42) (0.30) 
SL -0.29 -0.24 0.16 -0.29 
 (0.34) (0.27) (0.39) (0.28) 
CS -0.74** -0.73*** -1.33** -0.91*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.53) (0.32) 
Female 0.35 0.15 -0.53* -0.93*** 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.28) (0.22) 
Graduate -0.64 -0.59 -0.44 -0.69* 
 (0.40) (0.37) (0.46) (0.37) 
PhD/Posgraduate -0.71 -0.58 -0.05 -0.58 
 (0.49) (0.42) (0.58) (0.43) 
Atheist 1.23*** 1.10*** 1.34*** 1.32*** 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.35) (0.27) 
Muslim 0.36 0.11 0.92** -0.18 
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.41) (0.38) 
Other -0.07 -0.14 0.51 0.14 
 (0.41) (0.30) (0.42) (0.34) 
Delhi NCR 0.30 -0.26 -0.66 -0.22 
 (0.48) (0.31) (0.63) (0.40) 
West Bengal 0.11 0.33 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.42) (0.32) (0.50) (0.36) 
Southern states 0.30 0.13 0.76* 0.66* 
 (0.36) (0.31) (0.39) (0.35) 
North East 0.21 0.31 -1.31** -0.73** 
 (0.38) (0.28) (0.53) (0.35) 
Jammu & Kashmir -0.09 0.18  0.03 
 (0.92) (0.63)  (0.72) 
Abroad 1.60 0.24 -0.23 -0.62 
 (0.97) (0.82) (1.14) (0.75) 
Age (logged) 0.83 1.05 -0.78 0.37 
 (1.27) (0.90) (1.43) (0.95) 
Observations 473 473 497 470 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
